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WHO IS THIS REPORT FOR?  
•        Donors, including philanthropic foundations and bilateral and multilateral aid donors, concerned with land governance and land 
rights, access to justice and Sustainable Development Goal (“SDG”) 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions), community legal 
empowerment, benefit sharing, corporate accountability, and/or environmental justice, among other fields. 
•       Communities who have been or stand to be affected by investment projects, and who hope to find new ways to finance 
the legal support they need, as well as the civil society organizations (“CSOs”) that work with those communities or on 
policy issues around responsible land investments. 
•       Governments hosting land investments (referred to as “host governments”). 
•       Companies that conduct land investment, such as agricultural or forestry projects (referred to as “investor companies” or 
“companies”), seeking stable and cooperative working relationships with host communities. 
•       Development Finance Institutions (“DFIs”), such as the International Finance Corporation or government-owned finance 
institutions, potentially as well as commercial banks and financiers, whose clients undertake land investments. 
•       Commodity buyers, such as food and beverage companies and other companies in a range of industries, that buy 
agricultural or forest commodities. 
•        Multi-stakeholder initiatives (“MSIs”) and other bodies with members who include investor companies or commodity buyers. 
•         Impact investors interested in improving the social and environmental impacts of land investments. 
•         Lawyers who support communities affected by investment. 
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“The Malen situation is a classic example of how not to 
conduct large-scale land acquisitions …. A company relies 
on the government to acquire land for its investment, the 
government gives instructions to the Paramount Chief, 
who then requires that the sub-chiefs make the land 
available. A lease agreement is drawn up by a government 
lawyer and … thumb-printed by a few community 
members who do not understand its content. … [E]ven 
though money is paid and a document drawn up by a 
lawyer is signed, it still feels like a forceful taking, a 
dispossession clothed in legality. It reads like a collusion 
between the government and the investor—an alliance of 
the powerful and wealthy—to strip a community of their 
most valuable resource. Unsurprisingly, [the investor] has 
had to rely heavily on the powers of the government to 
deal with the resentment against the deal.” 
 
Sonkita Conteh  
How not to conduct Large-scale Agricultural Investments:  
Lessons from the Malen/Socfin land dispute in Sierra Leone (2018) 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Rice plantation, Bali. 
© Emilio JoseG/Shutterstock
Communities affected by agricultural, forestry, and other resource investments 
urgently need increased funding for legal and technical support. Too many 
communities struggle to access the support they need to protect their interests, in 
large part because they cannot afford it. This is in stark contrast to companies, who 
can generally afford the legal and technical support needed for their investments. 
Inadequate support can weaken a community’s ability to: prepare internally; 
influence due diligence and planning; consult and interact with a company about a 
proposed project; negotiate a contract with a company; monitor company 
operations; engage in dispute resolution; litigate and enforce relevant judgments; 
and ensure responsible project closure. As a result, communities around the world 
risk losing access to critical land and resources, suffering human rights violations, or 
missing opportunities to benefit from investments. The inability of communities to 
secure necessary support can also result in conflict and challenges that are damaging 
for companies, host governments, and other actors.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Although donors, support providers, and others have found 
ways to support communities directly and indirectly, their 
combined efforts can only extend so far. To fill the financing 
gap, promising new opportunities exist. But they require both 
catalytic and sustained efforts by a range of different actors, 
and present their own challenges, which must be carefully 
addressed. This report presents a call to action for different 
stakeholders to help communities secure the support they so 
crucially need. 
 
FINANCING OPTIONS  
In the context of investment, communities often require the 
services of CSOs, paralegals, organizers, non-legal experts, 
lawyers, or other actors. Yet for each investment-related process 
necessitating some form of community support, certain 
financing options may be better suited than others. 
Nonetheless, an approach that finances community support 
both before the project (preparation, consultation, negotiation) 
and afterwards (monitoring, dispute resolution, closure) 
reinforces and enhances the impact of any support given. 
 
1.  Government marshaling  
Host governments seeking to foster productive, conflict-free 
investments and attract responsible companies can finance 
community support by collecting additional money from 
companies and other actors, using taxes, fees, and penalties. 
In designing those mechanisms, governments will need to 
balance the goal of generating revenue with what is politically 
feasible. Other options governments can pursue to finance 
community legal support include collecting additional revenue 
from the legal profession, and using social impact bonds to 
marshal funding from impact investors. 
 
2.  Basket funds 
By collecting money from multiple sources, basket funds can 
move beyond traditional philanthropic and aid donors to 
secure funding from companies and other actors. Basket funds 
offer the promise of securing funding from private sector actors 
while minimizing their actual or perceived influence over 
communities and support providers. This is done by securing 
multiple funding sources to “dilute” the influence of any single 
funding source, and having a third party entity administer and 
pay out money. 
Contributing to a basket fund can help companies understand 
and incorporate community perspectives into the investment 
project’s design, work towards obtaining the community’s 
“social license to operate,” and avoid or resolve costly conflict. 
Aside from companies, other private sector actors may be 
motivated to participate in order to increase compliance with 
relevant performance standards or sustainability 
commitments. Donors may be interested in contributing to 
basket funds that complement and extend the reach of existing 
philanthropic efforts to finance community support, and that 
present strategies for achieving financial sustainability. 
 
3.  Impact investments  
Impact investments, which seek to achieve both a positive 
impact and a financial return, could theoretically be used to 
finance a small subset of community support needs. 
Specifically, impact investments may feasibly finance support: 
for negotiating benefit agreements that are expected to 
generate significant revenue for communities; for litigation 
where the community is seeking a substantial damages award; 
or using social impact bonds, where the funding for 
community support is repaid by a government or other 
“outcome payer” if the support achieves a pre-defined goal. 
 
4.  Third party funding 
Third party funders occasionally finance community support 
to litigate damages claims, such as for large-scale 
environmental pollution. Litigation funders usually finance the 
litigation costs in exchange for a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case. While funders may offer financial and 
strategic might to inexperienced community claimants, they 
also risk interfering with the lawyer-client relationship and 
influencing the litigation’s conduct in ways that may not be in 
the community’s interests. Third party funding is less feasible 
and appropriate in contexts where legal frameworks are not 
adequately developed or where rule of law is weak.  
 
5.  Direct company funding 
While companies may wish to directly finance community 
support in relation to specific company projects, such an 
approach should be considered with extreme caution. The 
community or its support provider may be unduly influenced 
by the knowledge that the company is financing the support. 
In addition, direct company funding cannot comprehensively 
increase community access to support. 
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6.  Other solutions  
Supplementary funding can be raised through crowd funding, 
earmarked profits from social enterprises, and community 
members themselves, either by paying affordable fees or 
providing in-kind services. Further, support providers can 
sometimes use contingency or uplift fees, meaning that they 
will only be paid if a successful outcome is achieved. In 
addition, fee shifting laws in some jurisdictions may entitle 
successful community claimants to have their support costs 
paid by the losing counter party. 
 
OVERARCHING CONSIDERATIONS  
Stakeholders seeking to develop a financing initiative must 
address a range of considerations. These include:  
•       The amount of money needed. An initiative’s likely cost 
will be affected by community preferences and needs 
regarding support and the initiative’s focus and scope. 
Data can be generated and used to understand likely 
needs and cost.  
•       Efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. Strategies 
are needed to reduce costs and to ensure an initiative’s 
financial sustainability. Effectiveness can be improved 
by: matching financing options to specific support 
needs; managing political complexity and obstacles; 
addressing the political economy implications of making 
more funding available; and employing appropriate 
governance mechanisms.  
•       Links between the initiative, communities, and 
support providers. The logistics required to link money, 
communities, and support providers may be affected by 
whether or not local CSOs can act as a bridge between 
financing initiatives and communities; the options 
available where no relevant local CSO exists; and 
determinations about who should receive money from 
the financing initiative and pay each support provider. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
In addition to current grant making efforts—which are and will 
remain crucial—donors should: help establish new financing 
initiatives, especially basket funds, given their potential to 
become self-sustaining; facilitate cooperation between 
different stakeholders; and continue to advance strategies for 
supporting the next generation of global south-based 
community support providers. 
Host governments can establish initiatives to finance 
community support, including through the marshaling of 
additional revenue. Governments should sensitize companies 
about the importance of adequate community support, and 
establish appropriate legal frameworks to facilitate and 
regulate different financing initiatives. 
Communities and the CSOs that support them can use the 
solutions and considerations in this report to guide concrete 
funding requests, demands, advocacy campaigns, and 
negotiation strategies. Those interested in promoting such 
opportunities should identify strategic moments to advance 
arguments and ideas for establishing expansive and robustly 
governed financing solutions. 
Agribusiness, forestry, and other natural resource companies 
should finance basket funds that apply beyond individual 
projects, and should commit to contributing resources 
regularly, on a long-term basis. 
Buyers, DFIs, private financiers, MSIs and other bodies with 
company members should consider contributing funding to 
basket funds and encourage or require companies within their 
spheres of influence to do so as well.  
Impact investors and impact investment funds should 
continue to explore investing in community support, and 
ensure that any investments avoid onerous and unrealistic 
repayment obligations for communities. 
Fee-charging lawyers working for communities should: 
investigate and pursue best practices with respect to 
contingency or uplift fees; explore ways to reduce costs, 
including by unbundling legal tasks; and consider accepting 
in-kind repayments or charging affordable user fees. For 
litigated matters, lawyers should ensure that any third party 
funding agreements protect the lawyer-client relationship and 
preserve community control over the litigation; lawyers should 
also consider applying to courts for advance funding of 
communities’ costs before cases proceed or for fee shifting 
after cases have concluded.  
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TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF FINANCING SOLUTIONS
Financing solution Funding 
source
Investment-related processes that could be 
covered
Main benefits and challenges 
Government 
marshaling of funding 
from companies and 
other actors, through 
taxes, fees, and 
penalties levied on 
different investment-
related activities, such 




•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Litigation 
•  Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS 
•  Could help fulfill governments’ human rights 
obligations and development commitments  
•  Governments have power to tax and charge penalties 
CHALLENGES 
•  Risk of misappropriation 





entities and funded by 






•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Project closure and rehabilitation 
BENEFITS 
•  Accesses new and relevant funding sources  
•  Potential to access large amounts of money 
CHALLENGES 
•  Will not work unless strong and innovative governance 
approaches to mitigate risk of undue influence by 
company or financial mismanagement by fund manager 
Market-based impact 
investments, including 
those made as loans to 
communities, repayable 






•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company (provided it is likely to include significant 
sharing of revenues with the community) 
•  Litigation (only damages claims where a large 
amount of money is sought)
BENEFITS 
•  Accesses new funding sources 
CHALLENGES 
•  High transactional costs and data needs  
•  Only applicable to communities seeking very large 
amounts of money from their counter-party or the 
underlying project
Social impact bonds, 
a form of impact 
investment where the 
money advanced to 
pay for community 
support is to be repaid 
by a government or 
other “outcome payer” 
if the support achieves 




to act as 
outcome 
payers
•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Litigation 
BENEFITS 
•  Outcome payers only pay for successful initiatives  
CHALLENGES 
•  Still requires public or donor funds to finance successful 
community support
Direct company 
funding of community 
support 
Companies •  Project closure and rehabilitation 
•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS 
•  Companies have proven willing to provide direct funding 
CHALLENGES 
•  High risk of perceived or actual undue influence
Third party funding, 
usually of support 
costs for litigation, in 
exchange for a 
financial interest in the 






•  Litigation (provided a sufficiently large amount of 
damages is sought) 
BENEFITS 
•  Funders bring large-scale litigation experience and 
significant funding for support, which can help achieve 
“equality of arms” 
CHALLENGES 
•  Power imbalances between funder and community  
•  The need to generate a financial return limits 
applicability; some important litigation outcomes 
(seeking injunctions, judicial review, etc.) not applicable 
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TABLE 2: OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR INCREASING FUNDING OR REDUCING COSTS
Financing solution Funding 
source
Investment-related processes that could be 
covered
Main benefits and challenges 
Crowd funding, 
using online 
platforms to secure 
donations from 
individuals
Citizen donors •  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Litigation 
•  Potentially others
BENEFITS 
•  Accesses new funding sources, with few restrictions on 
how money can be spent 
CHALLENGES 
•  Likely to only raise small amounts of money
Profits from social 
enterprise, which 







•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Litigation 
•  Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS 
•  Accesses new funding sources, with few restrictions on 
how money can be spent 
CHALLENGES 
•  The amount of revenue generated will depend on how 
much time and effort is put into it, and on the degree to 
which any needed expertise can be accessed 
•  Running a new enterprise brings its own financial risks, 
such as insolvency
Affordable user fees 
or in-kind services 
paid or provided by 
community 




•  Preparing internally before engaging with a company 
•  Influencing due diligence and planning  
•  Consultation and initial interactions with a company 
•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company 
•  Monitoring and fact-finding 
•  Dispute resolution 
•  Litigation 
•  Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS 
•  Encourages community buy-in for the support given 
•  Reduces dependence on outside funding sources 
CHALLENGES 
•  Not likely to generate sufficient funds to meet all of 
community’s support needs
Contingency and 
uplift fees, which 
render fees, 
calculated according 
to a pre-agreed 
formula, only 
payable if the 




•  Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a 
company (provided it is likely to include significant 
sharing of revenues with the community) 
•  Litigation (only damages claims where a large 
amount of money is sought)
BENEFITS 
•  No payments required up front 
•  Community only pays when support achieves 
successful outcomes 
CHALLENGES 
•  Legally prohibited in some jurisdictions 
•  Creates conflicting incentives for support provider 
•  Need to generate a financial return limits applicability; 
some important contractual outcomes (contracts not 
featuring extensive financial benefits) and litigation 
outcomes (seeking injunctions, judicial review, etc.)  
not applicable
Fee shifting, which 
entitles successful 
community 
claimants to have 
their support costs 
paid by the losing 





in a court case 
•  Litigation BENEFITS 
•  Community does not pay for successful cases 
•  Making the unsuccessful counter-party pay for costs 
can incentivize the avoidance and early resolution of 
community grievances 
CHALLENGES 
•  Fee shifting is often limited to “public interest”/ 
constitutional cases brought against governments 
THE DESPERATE NEED  
FOR INCREASED FINANCING FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT
Palm fruit worker, Malaysia. 
© jaiman taip/shutterstock
Land investments, such as investments in agriculture and forestry projects, continue to 
place intense pressure on community lands and resources in the global south. 
Companies, often navigating complex legal frameworks, generally can afford the legal 
or other technical support they require for their investments. In stark contrast, the 
communities potentially affected by such investments frequently struggle to access the 
support they need to protect their interests, in large part because they cannot afford it.1 
As a result, many communities are at risk. Without legal support in securing their resource 
rights or when negotiating a lease with an incoming company, they risk losing access to 
critical land and resources that sustain their livelihoods and provide social, cultural, or 
spiritual meaning. Without adequate support during consultations, monitoring, or the 
pursuit of urgent court orders to stop breaches of law or contract, communities risk 
suffering human rights violations. Without support negotiating a benefit agreement, they 
risk missed opportunities to secure enforceable development outcomes from the 
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investment. The frequent inability of communities to access 
needed support is not only devastating for communities: it can 
also result in conflict and challenges that are damaging for 
companies, host governments, and other actors.  
Adequately financed legal and technical support—from the 
moment a land investment is proposed until well after it has 
concluded—can help communities avoid and mitigate risks. This 
support can bolster community efforts to: make due diligence 
and planning processes more consultative; influence decision-
making regarding proposed investments; assert customary 
rights; negotiate a balanced agreement with an incoming 
company; monitor company operations; resolve grievances or 
disagreements with the company and/or government; or hold 
them to account through litigation or other processes. 
The need for community support in the context of investment is 
well recognized. The former UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous 
peoples2 and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,3 
for example, have emphasized the importance of community 
support for addressing power imbalances and facilitating 
informed community decision-making during consultations. A 
former World Bank staffer made similar observations in the 
context of community-company contract negotiations.4 As these 
experts have recognized, communities that lack sufficient legal 
and technical support during these early stages of potential land 
investments may have fewer strategies available to proactively 
defend their human rights and livelihoods, and to assert their 
priorities for sustainable development.  
When communities cannot access appropriate support, other 
actors—including companies, their financiers, and host 
governments—can also experience negative impacts. A lack of 
support increases the risk of community grievances, stemming 
from issues such as mismatched expectations, inadequate 
consultation, or onerous or unenforceable community-company 
contracts.5 Community grievances and social unrest can open the 
door to disputes and conflicts that result in significant human 
rights violations,6 poisoned community-company relations, 
and/or disrupted business operations. Conflicts and consequent 
project delays create significant financial and opportunity costs—
for companies seeking to generate profits, governments wishing 
to earn tax revenues, and community members hoping for 
associated development opportunities. One study estimated that 
delays stemming from tenure disputes can cost an agribusiness 
as much as $101 million in foregone revenue.7 Such disputes have 
also led to outright project failure, such as a Tanzanian sugar 
plantation, which received a $52 million investment but was 
abandoned before its first day of production.8 
The risks faced by communities and companies, while different 
in nature, evidence a striking need for innovative approaches 
to financing community support, and to increase the impact 
of existing funding. While the largely unmet need for general 
legal aid services around the world has been extensively 
researched, less attention has been given to the obstacles 
communities face in securing legal and technical support in 
the context of investment. The investment context creates 
specific and pressing support needs for communities, but it 
also presents possibilities for companies and other private 
sector actors to act as novel funding sources (albeit while 
introducing new challenges). This report evaluates a range of 
financing solutions for community support that can be 
adapted to different scales or focused on specific geographies 
or sectors. Given the potential costs of ignoring this financing 
gap, this report is as relevant for a company’s business 
managers as for its community relations team; similarly, it is 
as germane for host governments and DFIs as for affected 
communities, and the CSOs supporting them.  
Where, then, might the capital needed to finance legal and 
technical support be located? What challenges would be 
introduced by resorting to new funding sources or approaches, 
and how can those challenges be addressed? How can 
funding, once secured, be most effectively used to meet the 
support needs of communities? This report explores these 
questions. A follow-up paper will offer concrete guidance on 
one of the options discussed in this report: basket funds.  
BOX 1: WHAT IS “LEGAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT”?
Legal and technical support to communities includes formal legal assistance, as well as other forms of technical assistance or 
advice that communities may need when preparing for potential investment or engaging in processes related to a proposed 
investment. Such support may be provided by CSOs, lawyers, paralegals, and experts in business, economics, science, and impact 
assessments, among many other fields. 
THE CURRENT STATE OF FINANCING 
Although the current number of communities globally that 
need support relating to land investments is unknown,10 
representatives that we interviewed from the private sector, 
DFIs, academia, and civil society regularly noted that current 
funding for community support runs short of what is needed. 
The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil’s 2015 guide on free, 
prior and informed consent acknowledges that most 
communities lack support and, as a consequence, often do not 
understand their rights when approached by a company; the 
guide concludes that there is a clear need for improved legal 
and technical support to communities, while asking where the 
funding for such support would come from.11 
One civil society representative we interviewed noted that their 
organization had worked with local CSOs to support between 
200 and 300 communities in Indonesia, and estimated that the 
number of Indonesian communities needing support in the 
context of land investments could be several tens of 
thousands. While many different organizations already provide 
support to communities there, the representative strongly 
doubted that traditional donor funding would be made 
available to finance legal and technical support for this 
number of communities.12 While these observations focus on 
Indonesia, they help to illustrate the vast scale of funding that 
is potentially needed globally.  
Donors often fund non-profit CSOs, including those with legal 
or technical expertise that can be deployed to assist 
communities. Yet these CSOs almost never have the financial 
or human resources to meet the support needs of every 
affected community within their sphere of operations. Donors 
may also finance external experts in some circumstances; for 
example, donors funding community-led litigation may cover 
the cost of independent lawyers and expert witnesses in 
addition to financing the CSO that is the community’s primary 
point of contact. Yet the financial reserves of such donors can 
only extend so far.  
Communities can also obtain legal and technical support 
through other sources, although each also brings its own 
challenges. For instance:  
•       Lawyers and experts sometimes provide legal and 
technical assistance on a pro bono (free) basis. However, 
the demand for such services far outweighs the supply. 
Moreover, the need for long-term engagement limits how 
many pro bono matters experts can take on. In addition, 
many corporate law firms decline pro bono requests 
where the counter-party is a company that may be a 
current or future source of paid work.13 
 •      University- and donor-funded law clinics deploy lawyer-
supervised students to support communities. These 
clinics, however, can often only sustainably support a 
limited number of clients, especially when based overseas.  
•       Some companies directly finance legal and technical 
support for communities. Yet this introduces the risk of 
perceived or actual undue influence of the company over 
the community or support provider. Because of this risk, 
some support providers also will refuse to take money 
offered by companies. 
•       Some community members themselves pay for 
support. But their financial reserves are often extremely 
small, limiting which support providers they can procure 
after paying for other life- or livelihood-sustaining 
services or activities.  
While these sources each crucially help to fill support gaps that 
communities face, together they still remain woefully inadequate 
to meet the vast needs of communities affected by land 
investments. Additional financing models are therefore needed. 
As shortfalls in funding for community support have become 
more apparent, the need to find additional solutions to finance 
legal and technical support has been highlighted by a range of 
different actors, including academics,14 researchers,15 civil 
society actors,16 indigenous communities,17 international 
organizations,18 and multi-stakeholder groups19 and networks20 
that include companies, DFIs, and industry bodies. The need 
for improved financing solutions is also evidenced by a 
number of pioneering efforts to develop new approaches. At 
least two organizations have attempted to develop basket 
funds to meet community legal and/or technical support 
needs.21 Others are experimenting with impact investment, 
third party litigation funding, and crowd funding to help 
increase the amount of money available for community legal 
and technical support. 
 
WHAT TYPES OF SUPPORT DO 
COMMUNITIES NEED MORE OF? 
Communities who are, or who stand to be, affected by land 
investments often require the services of CSOs, paralegals, 
organizers, non-legal experts, lawyers, or other actors. These 
support providers can help communities meaningfully 
participate in, or otherwise protect their interests during, 
different investment-related processes. 
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Certain financing models may be better suited to different 
processes. Nonetheless, an approach that covers community 
support needs both before a project begins (preparation, 
consultation, negotiation) and afterwards (monitoring, dispute 
resolution, project closure) reinforces and enhances the 
impact of any support given. For instance, legal support for 
contract negotiations may be undermined if the community 
cannot later access support to hold the company to its 
obligations through monitoring and dispute resolution.
Support providers can help communities to carry out any of the following: 
•       Preparing internally before engaging with companies. This includes learning about 
community members’ rights, mapping and seeking formal recognition of land rights, 
visioning and other reflection, and establishing representative structures and decision-
making processes for the management of lands and resources.22
•       Influencing due diligence and planning processes. This includes advocating to, and 
engaging with, government and company actors for community perspectives to be 
adequately incorporated into early due diligence and planning processes, including 
feasibility studies and impact assessments.
•       Consultation and initial interactions with a company. This includes understanding a 
proposed investment project’s likely impacts; accessing and reviewing information, 
including legal frameworks and any relevant existing contracts (with the host 
government, financial institutions, etc.); communicating community perspectives and 
priorities; and avoiding signing a contract before arriving at an informed decision.23
•       Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a company. This includes preparing 
for and participating in contract negotiations, as well as drafting contracts such as 
leases or agreements for benefit sharing, outgrower schemes, or partnerships.24
•       Monitoring and fact-finding. This includes monitoring the project’s impacts, as well as 
the company’s compliance with any relevant contracts, laws, or policies. Monitoring can 
also include gathering evidence for future negotiations, advocacy, or even litigation. 
•       Dispute resolution. This includes attempting to resolve grievances or disputes with the 
company through informal discussions, formal meetings and negotiations, mediation, 
or other processes, such as grievance mechanisms established by the company or a 
relevant DFI or MSI. It also may include navigating such processes and employing 
strategies to mitigate power imbalances. 
•       Litigation. This includes preparing for and pursuing court cases against the company, 
host government, or related actors, as well as post-litigation monitoring and 
enforcement of judgments.
•       Ensuring responsible project closure and rehabilitation. This includes holding the 
company and host government to their obligations, if they have any, to implement 
closure plans and/or rehabilitate and return the land to the community when a project 
winds down or is terminated. 
FINANCING  
SOLUTIONS
Rice field, Thailand. 
© oBebee/shutterstock
While governments, donors, the private sector, and civil society all have a role to play, their 
specific interests in promoting financing solutions align and diverge at different points. 
Stakeholders’ opportunities to take concrete action will also vary. These factors have 
implications for the types of initiatives that any specific constellation of actors may try, as 
well as the parameters of those initiatives. For instance, the shared interest of community 
advocates and companies in reducing potential conflict in a specific area might result in 
an initiative that draws primarily from private sector funding sources to finance support 
for negotiations and for resolving grievances, but that does not finance litigation.  
Any financing initiative should therefore identify which activities would be covered. 
Designing a needs-based initiative might entail identifying the ideal scope to address 
documented needs, and then matching that scope to the incentives and challenges 
of potential contributors of funding. In some cases, a proactive funding source may 
instead be the starting point, and may state for which processes it would be willing 
to finance community support. 
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1. GOVERNMENT MARSHALING  
 
Host governments—especially democratic ones—are an intuitive 
source of funding for community legal and technical support, 
given their human rights obligations, SDG commitments, and 
ability to collect revenue from citizens and corporations. This 
section explores how governments can generate funding beyond 
existing tax revenue;25 in doing so, governments can seek to 
increase the support available to communities without diverting 
finite public resources from other important public services.26 
 
Why would governments want to marshal finance? 
Host governments, and the many entities and actors they 
comprise, may have a number of reasons for seeking new ways 
to pay for community support.  
•       Low- and middle-income countries usually struggle to 
provide basic legal services for all citizens,27 not just 
communities affected by investment. Marshaling new 
sources of funding can thus increase the government’s 
available financial resources to address this vital need 
in the context of land investments.  
•       Financing support for communities for processes such as 
consultations, negotiations, or non-judicial dispute 
resolution can help companies and communities 
establish and maintain stable relationships. Such 
stability can lead to more productive and conflict-free 
investments that produce anticipated benefits for host 
countries, such as revenues, and help governments to 
attract the most responsible companies.  
•       Community support for monitoring could also 
potentially complement host government efforts to 
monitor investments, as supported communities could 
more effectively observe, and promptly notify the 
government of, any issues of importance that arise.28 
•       Governments could fund community support for 
additional processes, including those aimed at resolving 
conflict and/or addressing rights violations, to 
productively respond to political pressure they face, 
including from social movements or CSOs voicing 
community grievances, international partners calling for 
the advancement of SDG 16, or even companies wishing 
to resolve existing, and avoid future, community conflict.  
•        Funding services can help governments demonstrate their 
commitment to addressing public outcry concerning 
investment or justice gaps, helping to maintain political 
stability, avoid popular revolts,29 and/or regain citizen trust 
following a period of armed conflict or fragility.30 
 
Taxes, fees, and penalties 
The arrival of a company will often increase a local community’s 
need for legal and technical support. To address this increased 
need, host governments can use taxes, fees, and penalties to 
collect additional money from companies to finance community 
support. Taxes and fees involve charging a company for certain 
activities, such as: applications for, or the granting of, permits or 
licenses; the commencement of the project; or one or more pre-
established thresholds of production, revenue, or profits 
generated by the company. (Taxes on specific processes that 
marshal revenue for a specific purpose are sometimes called 
“parafiscal taxes.”) Penalties, on the other hand, can apply when 
companies contravene certain rules, such as breaches of law or 
concession contracts, and would be payable in addition to any 
liability for damages or loss that such breaches cause. The rates 
EXAMPLE: TAXING COMPANIES TO FINANCE  
COMMUNITY CONSULTATION IN CANADA 
The Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act,31 a law in Alberta, Canada, sought to impose a levy on resource companies that would be 
paid to a fund that could be accessed by First Nations and other aboriginal communities to develop their capacity for, and to 
pay relevant costs relating to, consultation processes. Details about how much revenue was to be collected and how grants would 
be made were to be included in Regulations, which were never drafted.32 The initiative was repealed, however, in part because 
of First Nations’ concerns regarding strict time limits set out in the Act for consultation processes and the lack of recourse for 
First Nations if the government-run consultation office determined that no consultation was required in a particular case.33 This 
illustrates the importance of adequately incorporating community perspectives into the design of government marshaling 
strategies, and of other initiatives, that aim to increase the amount of money available for community support. 
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of taxes, fees, and/or penalties should be calibrated to balance 
the goal of revenue generation with considerations of what is 
politically feasible. By marshaling funds specifically for community 
support, a government would create a type of basket fund, which 
is a fund with multiple contributing entities; Section “2. Basket 
funds,” below, is therefore also relevant to this approach.
Trust fund interest and other moneys collected  
from legal professional practice  
Another strategy for government marshaling of funding for 
community support is to collect interest on lawyers’ trust 
accounts (“IOLTA”) or other payments related to legal 
professional practice. In many countries, client money is often 
EXAMPLE: IMPOSING PENALTIES PER COMPLAINT LODGED IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman34 establishes a consumer complaints process that is financed 
exclusively by penalties charged to the member telecommunications company that is the subject of each complaint. Companies 
pay a “volume fee” (based on the overall proportion of complaints made against them in a given year) and an operating cost fee 
that goes towards the Ombudsman’s operational costs such as staff salaries. In addition to generating additional financing, this 
scheme is believed to also motivate companies to resolve complaints before they reach the Ombudsman.35 The financial feasibility 
of adapting a similar penalties-based approach to an initiative to finance community support would depend on the number of 
grievances that might be anticipated in a country or region, and the political feasibility of imposing penalty rates that are high 
enough to generate sufficient money. 
PROPOSAL: FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES  
THROUGH COMPANY FEES IN SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone’s 2013 Draft Guidelines For Sustainable Agricultural And Bioenergy Investment call for the establishment of a 
Community Justice Fund.36 Companies, after registering with the country’s investment promotion agency, would periodically pay a 
mandatory fee calculated to cover the average monthly cost of a Sierra Leonian lawyer. Companies would then submit a consultation 
plan detailing how they will seek to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of communities potentially affected by the proposed 
investment. Companies would then carry out consultations and impact assessments, before negotiating leases with community 
land owners and a memorandum of understanding and agreement with the government.37 The fund would be administered by the 
District Council, with oversight by the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. Money would be allocated to pay a lawyer chosen 
by the community from a network of justice organizations and practitioners supported by the Human Rights Commission. The lawyer 
would provide “community justice services, including legal advice, assistance, representation and […] education in the negotiation 
process” with the company.38 Proponents of “large and huge scale impact projects” would pay the fee monthly, while smaller projects 
would pay the same fee but on a less frequent basis (thus paying proportionately less overall).  
The policy, while still in draft form, appears to have benefitted from strong civil society collaboration and guidance; the emphasis 
on financing legal support may also be legitimized by Sierra Leone’s constitutional recognition of the right to legal aid.39 
Sierra Leone’s National Land Policy also sets out that the government shall take measures to implement a legal assistance fund 
for “legal and paralegal assistance to communities, land owners and land users in negotiation with potential large scale land 
investors,” as a strategy to implement its goal of creating an enabling environment to attract responsible and rights respecting 
investment.40 This legal assistance fund has not yet been established, and it is not clear whether the government will employ the 
same ideas that have been outlined for financing the abovementioned Community Justice Fund. 
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held in trust by lawyers in anticipation of fees and expenses.41 
Some governments collect the interest that these trust 
accounts generate and use it to increase funding available for 
legal aid. This approach could be used to help finance 
investment-related community legal support, although the 
money raised would likely be allocated to a broader category 
of legal aid funding, given the lack of a direct connection to 
land investments. Marshaling IOLTA in a global south context 
may not generate enough revenue by itself to finance a large 
amount of legal support; this strategy may therefore be better 
deployed to complement, and contribute to the financial 
sustainability of, other financing initiatives.  
IOLTA is a large source of legal aid funding in Australia and 
Canada, among other countries. In Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe, IOLTA is collected for “fidelity funds,” 
which compensate clients who suffer loss because of their 
lawyers’ illicit or dishonest conduct.42 Aside from IOLTA, other 
moneys also can be collected from legal professional practice. 
Pursuant to a recently introduced initiative in Singapore, for 
example, unclaimed client money held in trust by lawyers will 
now be allocated to a fund intended to supplement pro bono 
services.43 In Malaysia and Barbados, fidelity funds and some 
legal aid services are financed by annual contributions from 
members of bar associations.44 
 
Social impact bonds 
Governments can also marshal funding from impact investors 
through using social impact bonds. These involve investors 
advancing money for community support in exchange for 
payouts from the government (or other outcome payers) if pre-
agreed goals are achieved. Social impact bonds are discussed 
further in “3. Impact investment,” below.
2. BASKET FUNDS  
 
In this report, a basket fund refers to a collection of money from 
multiple sources to be spent on legal and technical support for 
communities. Basket funds can be administered by an existing 
third party entity or a newly established trust or foundation with 
an arm’s length relationship to companies and communities. 
Basket funds can move beyond traditional philanthropic and aid 
donors, potentially securing money from companies, commodity 
buyers and traders, and DFIs, among other actors. Basket funds 
that draw on a large number of funding sources minimize the risk 
of dramatic reductions in financial contributions. Such risks can 
be further minimized by securing commitments for contributions 
to be made on a regular basis.  
This report focuses on basket funds that provide grants for 
external support providers, rather than employing in-house 
support providers.48 Grant-making reduces operating costs by 
requiring fewer in-house staff,49 and allows more flexibility for 
community members to choose support providers with 
appropriate skills and experience. Such an arrangement can 
also more easily leverage existing CSOs that have the trust of, 
and ongoing relationships with, the community. 
A basket fund offers the promise of leveraging money from 
companies and other actors in a way that minimizes their 
actual or perceived influence over communities and support 
providers. Such influence is minimized in two ways. First, 
obtaining money from multiple sources with differing interests 
and in a balanced proportion can “dilute” any funding source’s 
ability to use its contribution as a point of leverage over a 
community.50 The risk of undue influence may diminish as each 
source’s contribution becomes a smaller portion of the total 
money raised, although basket funds receiving money from 
multiple entities with similar interests, such as a company and 
its financier for an investment project, may not achieve this 
dilution effect. Secondly, having a third party entity administer 
EXAMPLE: COLLECTING INTEREST ON TRUST ACCOUNTS  
TO FINANCE LAW CLINICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
In Namibia and South Africa, interest earned on client moneys that lawyers hold in trust is allocated to a fidelity fund.45 In certain 
circumstances in Namibia and South Africa, some of that money can be allocated to education or research in legal professional 
practice.46 In South Africa, some fidelity fund money also has been used to finance law clinics,47 providing a glimpse of how fidelity 
funds could be used to help finance community legal support.
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and pay out money can help protect against such influence by 
excluding funding sources from the determination of who will 
receive money, and under which conditions. Design choices, 
such as the extent to which contributions and contributors are 
kept confidential (discussed below), can further disassociate 
money paid out from any specific contributor. 
 
Why would different actors want to contribute 
to a basket fund? 
Companies might contribute to a basket fund for several reasons.  
•        Contributing to a basket fund can help companies 
understand and incorporate community perspectives, work 
towards obtaining the community’s “social license to 
operate,” and avoid or resolve costly conflict.51 Adequate 
financing of community support for consultations and 
negotiations can improve community-company 
communication, help align expectations about future 
decision-making and the project’s potential impacts, and 
encourage potentially lasting consensus.52 In addition, 
financing support for dispute resolution may help resolve 
existing community grievances before they lead to litigation.53 
•       Contributing to a basket fund may increase the potential 
for stable community-company relations by enabling 
communities to become strong counter parties. Basket 
funds can help communities access the support they 
need without worrying that doing so increases the 
company’s influence. Basket funds are therefore a 
desirable alternative to direct, project-specific company 
funding, which may create such concerns.54 
•       Basket funds that receive contributions from multiple 
companies would also enable companies seeking to 
implement responsible investments to do so on a more 
level playing field with any competitor companies who 
participate.55 
Commodity buyers and sellers, such as food and beverage 
companies and commodity traders, may be motivated to 
contribute to a basket fund to avoid negative impacts and 
related community grievances that may harm their reputation.56 
Financing community support may also help buyers to fulfill 
commitments to sustainability or good governance.57 
DFIs and commercial financiers might be motivated to 
contribute to, or otherwise participate in the establishment of, 
a basket fund,58 as a strategy for increasing compliance with 
finance-linked performance standards. Increased funding for 
community support (through initiatives like basket funds) could 
improve a client company’s compliance with performance 
standards or other loan conditions in various ways.59 For 
instance, support to an Indigenous community during 
consultations may help a company to obtain that community’s 













Funding can be sourced from various entities. One option is to source regular funding from companies and buyers of their products. Foundations and donors 
could provide initial “seed” funding and/or ongoing funding to help diversify the basket fund’s funding sources. DFIs, commercial banks, MSIs, industry bodies 
and/or host governments could also assist, including by encouraging or requiring companies within their sphere of influence to contribute funding, or potentially 
by contributing funding themselves.  
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free, prior and informed consent, as required under the IFC’s 
Performance Standards and the Equator Principles.60 A 
meaningful consent process might also help the company to 
better apprehend and avoid adverse social or environmental 
impacts, minimizing the likelihood of community grievances 
and conflict. Fewer grievances and less conflict would reduce 
the demand on finance-linked grievance mechanisms, protect 
the financier’s reputation, and avoid disruptions to company 
operations, which could imperil the company’s ability to 
generate profits. Adequately supported communities can also 
more effectively monitor, and notify relevant financial 
institutions, if a company breaches relevant standards.  
Multi-stakeholder initiatives with fee-paying company members 
may also be interested in participating in the establishment of a 
basket fund as a means of furthering their internal sustainability 
principles. For instance, MSI standards and requirements that 
companies obtain the free, prior and informed consent of 
affected communities61 may be more likely to be met where 
communities can access appropriate support to help them 
understand available information and make informed decisions 
when engaging with the company.62 If such initiatives do not have 
sufficient resources to make a financial contribution towards a 
basket fund themselves, they may still play a useful role by 
encouraging or even requiring member companies to make 
financial contributions to a relevant basket fund. 
Donors,63 including philanthropic foundations and bilateral and 
multilateral aid organizations, that are interested in ensuring that 
communities have access to relevant support may be interested 
in contributing funding, especially to help establish a basket fund 
that has a clear strategy for becoming financially sustainable 
and not overly dependent on continued donor funding.64 While 
not the only model for donor participation, donors could 
contribute initial “seed” money while also financing the 
development of a basket fund’s objectives, scope, and structure. 
Helping to pay for these initial activities could help avoid actual 
or perceived undue influence from well-resourced private sector 
actors while the ground rules are set, thereby minimizing the risks 
of such influence throughout the basket fund’s operation. 
 
Initial considerations and design questions  
for basket funds 
Basket funds can take many forms, depending on their scale 
and the actors involved in their design. Aside from the initial 
considerations, discussed in “Governance,” below, that apply 
to financing initiatives generally, considerations specific to 
basket funds include: 
•       Scope. The basket fund’s scope will affect the entities 
willing to provide funding; for instance, focusing on 
specific commodities or production areas may help to 
attract buyers or traders of such commodities, 
commodity-specific MSIs, or donors with interests in 
supporting communities in relevant production areas.  
•       Avoiding undue influence. Steps should be taken to 
address potential concerns that basket funds financed 
by corporate actors would introduce the risk of conflicts 
of interest or undue influence.65 Specific approaches to 
reduce these concerns, each with their own costs or 
challenges, include: routing the money through a trusted 
third party entity; sourcing funding from a wide variety of 
sources; and sourcing money from company 
foundations, rather than from company project budget 
lines to help de-emphasize the link between the money 
and a company’s specific investment project.66 
•       Transparency. A basket fund may be established with 
varying degrees of transparency. It could function as a 
“black box” fund, in which funding sources and amounts 
are kept confidential to reduce each contributor’s 
PROPOSAL: PEACENEXUS COMPANY-COMMUNITY TRUST FUND, MOROCCO
In 2015, PeaceNexus, a foundation focusing on peace-building in conflict-affected contexts, proposed establishing a basket fund 
that would source funding mostly from companies, while still seeking to build trust between all stakeholders. The fund’s goals 
were to “strengthen and support community-company dialogue and the ability of stakeholders to engage and influence decision-
making,” especially in fragile extractive sector contexts.74 Peace Nexus sought to pilot this approach at the national level in 
Morocco,75 and committed to finance the secretariat that would collect and pay out money for the first year. To date, however, 
the fund is yet to become operational. One interviewee opined that the large number of relevant stakeholders for a national-
level fund created a degree of political complexity that had stymied the fund’s establishment.76 
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connection to, and potential influence over, the basket 
fund, the recipient community, and/or their support 
providers. Alternatively, the basket fund could disclose 
who contributes money but not the amounts that each 
contributed; this might allow stakeholders to understand 
who is participating, while minimizing the ability of any 
specific entity to use its contribution as a point of 
leverage. Finally, the fund could function as a “glass box” 
fund, where all contributions (and, potentially, 
contributors) are transparently disclosed; this approach 
can help address suspicions of secrecy by allowing 
stakeholders to track amounts paid into the basket 
fund.67 Determining how much information to disclose 
regarding amounts paid out and/or the recipients also 
requires careful consideration. Full disclosure could help 
to detect any misappropriation of money but could also 
stoke resentment among neighboring communities. It 
may also be strategically disadvantageous to disclose a 
community’s support budget to any counter-party. A 
more suitable protection against misappropriation could 
be to arrange for regular, independent audits. 
•       Role of government. For non-governmental initiatives, 
host governments might still play a productive role, 
depending on the degree to which they are trusted by 
local communities and other stakeholders.68 Host 
government actors can potentially, among other things, 
participate in multi-stakeholder oversight committees, 
offer vital knowledge about the local context, and help 
to sensitize incoming companies of the need to 
contribute money for community support. 
EXAMPLE: KUMACAYA
Kumacaya is a basket fund initiative that collects money from multiple private sector actors for specific monitoring or research 
jobs that Kumacaya designs before tendering them to in-country CSOs. Kumacaya is currently based at the Earthworm Foundation 
(formerly TFT), an initiative with fee-paying member companies, which include companies that carry out relevant agricultural 
and forestry projects and “end user” buyers of agricultural and forestry products. The sources of funding for each job are kept 
confidential so that CSOs are not at risk of being influenced or discouraged from applying. In many cases, the identities of 
successful CSO bidders are also kept confidential. Each job targets specific production areas where multiple producers operate 
and multiple buyers source commodities; this helps to attract funding from multiple, often competing, companies. Examples of 
jobs advertised include researching the conditions of oil palm mill and plantation workers in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, and 
measuring the quality of free, prior and informed consent processes that have taken place in parts of Liberia.69
EXAMPLE: RSPO DSF TRUST FUND70 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)—a global MSI with members including oil palm plantation companies, processors 
and traders, manufacturers and retailers of palm oil products, financial institutions, and CSOs—established a trust fund to finance 
support for participants in its Dispute Settlement Facility (DSF), which uses mediation to facilitate the settlement of disputes. The 
trust fund is financed by a portion of annual member fees, which range from €100-2,000.71 The fund was established in 2009 to 
meet concerns about how affected community members would finance any capacity building or technical support needed when 
participating in a DSF processes. As of December 2018, however, no money had been paid out from the fund to participants in DSF 
processes. Two interviewees suggested that this was due at least in part to a lack of awareness of the fund’s existence;72 one of 
those interviewees also asserted that a CSO assisting a community had been told that it was not eligible to access the fund.73
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PROPOSAL: A BLIND TRUST IN INDONESIA77
The Samdhana Institute, an Indonesian non-profit organization that provides small grants to grassroots initiatives and organizations, 
ran a trust fund from 2011-2013 to advise project-affected communities in Sumatra, Indonesia. Money from the trust was provided to 
CSOs working with specific communities to pay lawyers, resource economists, or other experts supporting communities. The trust 
started with philanthropic funding and planned to transition to a “blind trust” with multi-party funding to increase the scale of 
communities that could be reached. In 2013, however, donor funding concluded, and the transition to a blind trust could not be realized.  
The intention had been for Samdhana to expand the trust by seeking financial and in-kind contributions from all relevant 
stakeholders and to manage financial contributions in a blind trust. The “blind trust” element was to be designed to avoid a 
direct link between any company’s financial contribution to the trust and any moneys paid for support to a particular community. 
Agribusiness and forestry companies that had made human rights commitments and/or had experienced conflicts with 
communities would provide funding; donors would finance the trust’s operational costs; local government would be asked to 
provide experts and venues for meetings; and communities would be asked to make “in kind” contributions such as providing 
additional venues and food for meetings. Applications to the trust would be made by CSOs who had already entered into an 
agreement with affected communities that sought advice and support. The blind trust would contract with successful applicant 
CSOs, who would then be accountable for procuring the relevant technical support for the community.  
A foundation in Indonesia is currently researching how a blind trust with similar purposes and financing strategies as Samdhana’s 
planned blind trust could be implemented. 
3. IMPACT INVESTING 
 
Impact investments could be used to secure funding to pay for 
community support in situations where the support is 
expected to achieve a pre-agreed goal that would enable 
and/or justify the investors to be paid back. Impact 
investments differ from mainstream investments (such as 
loans or purchasing shares) in that they are designed to 
generate both a measurable positive social and/or 
environmental impact and a financial return.78 The intent to 
generate a financial return in turn distinguishes impact 
investments from philanthropy or grant making.  
Because impact investments are profit-seeking, they are only 
feasible for financing community support in the rare contexts 
where there is an opportunity for significant compensation. 
Specifically, impact investment could be used to finance: the 
negotiation of benefit agreements that are expected to 
generate very large amounts of revenue for communities; 
litigation where the community is seeking a very large sum of 
damages or compensation; or social impact bonds, where a 
government, donor, or other actor is willing to ultimately 
finance the legal support, as an “outcome payer.”
How the impact investment is structured will affect who is 
responsible for paying impact investors. In the case of social 
impact bonds (see Box 2, below), commitments for repayment 
are secured from governments, donors, DFIs or other entities 
willing to act as outcome payers who compensate investors 
upon the achievement of pre-agreed goals. For other impact 
investment models, communities themselves could be bound 
to pay back the funding; for instance, the RTC Impact Fund 
(discussed below) proposes to finance support to communities 
wishing to negotiate benefit agreements, on the understanding 
that if the community secures sufficient money through the 
agreement, it will gradually pay back the money provided, 
potentially with interest or at a premium.  
Financial returns for impact investors can vary. Some 
investments may be structured to only return some or all of 
the money invested (“capital preservation”) and others may 
produce below-market interest or profits (“concessionary 
investments”). Others, still, might seek to produce risk-adjusted 
market-rate returns, although such returns may be extremely 
unlikely in the case of impact investments to finance 
community support. 
Any initiative seeking to finance community support through 
impact investing should be designed to avoid exploitative levels of 
investor profits that would ultimately be paid by communities. For 
instance, if an impact investment is structured as a loan with a high 
compounding interest rate, communities could find themselves 
locked into a cycle of inescapable debt, as has happened with 
some microfinance interventions.79 Similarly, an arrangement for 
impact investors to be paid a percentage of any benefit-sharing 
revenues might not leave enough funds for the community to 
pursue vital livelihood strategies or to adjust for the project’s 
negative impacts. Impact investment arrangements should 
therefore carefully define and limit when, if ever, the community 
would be required to pay. Hybrid or blended approaches to 
repayments, such as sharing repayment obligations between a 
community and donor, or having a government guarantee a 
community’s repayment obligations, may help to avoid 
exploitative arrangements and make impact investments viable. 
Whether impact investment should be used to finance 
community support in a specific case will depend on various 
factors. These include:  
•        The goal that triggers repayment. Impact investments 
usually define the social and/or environmental impacts they 
seek to achieve. Yet the outcomes of different processes or 
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BOX 2: WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS?
A social impact bond (SIB) is a financial instrument that functions on a “payment by results” basis.80 If an SIB were used to finance 
community support, an impact investor would pay money to an intermediary, which would disburse the money to one or more 
support providers.81 If the community support achieved pre-agreed goals, the “outcome payer”—this could be the government, a 
donor, or another entity—would be obliged to pay an agreed premium to the investor. SIBs’ payment-by-results model makes them 
most appropriate where a demonstrable public saving or desirable development impact will be secured by achieving the pre-agreed 
goal and when the outcome payer wants to avoid the risk of paying for an initiative that might not achieve desired impacts.82 For 
example, an SIB in the United Kingdom saw investors finance rehabilitation services for ex-prisoners from Peterborough jail; these 
services were intended to reduce recidivism, thereby minimizing the government’s expenditure on prosecutions and imprisonment. 
The pre-agreed goal, a 7.5% reduction in recidivism, was achieved, and the government paid back the investors with interest.83 If 
pre-agreed goals are not achieved, as occurred when a similar SIB failed to reduce youth recidivism at New York City’s Rikers Island 
prison by 10%, the government pays back nothing or proportionally reduces the repayment of money to the investor.84   
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community actions are not always predictable. A tension 
may emerge between impact investors focusing on 
achieving a financial return (who would aim to set a low bar 
for repayment) and the entities responsible for repaying 
(who may prefer to give the community sufficient autonomy 
to determine its priorities and strategies, so that the support 
empowers rather than constrains community members). For 
example, a goal focused on achieving a target number of 
negotiated contracts could be too simplistic; it might create 
perverse incentives or simply not be met, given that some 
communities may ultimately decide not to negotiate with a 
company. Having different classes of impact investors, 
including “first loss” partners who absorb the risk when full 
financial returns are not achieved, may help in finding 
arrangements that are acceptable both to investors and to 
those responsible for repaying. Donors willing to act as a first 
loss partner can help catalyze impact investments by 
encouraging additional investors. 
•        Availability of data. For a host government or donor to 
issue an impact bond, they would have to view improved 
community support as producing a social good worth 
paying for. To determine this, the government or donor may 
need to generate new data to determine the various public 
costs of not making support available to community 
members.85 Impact investors also need data to develop a 
risk profile for the proposed investment in community legal 
support and understand its likely outcomes, both in terms 
of social impact and financial return.86 Investors will also 
rely on a mechanism to monitor their investments and 
determine whether the pre-agreed goal has been achieved.  
•        Financial considerations affecting viability. Impact 
investments often require significant amounts of regularly 
updated data, increasing their transactional and 
operational costs. These costs, and the likely costs of hiring 
support providers, will therefore need to be compared to 
the amounts of money that supported communities can 
expect to gain or the savings or other beneficial outcomes 
such financing support may produce. For impact 
investments relying on communities for repayment, due 
consideration must also be given to the community’s 
financial needs for basic survival and livelihood generation 
in the short, medium, and long term. In practice, such 
impact investments may therefore only be feasible where a 
community seeks a sufficiently large amount of money 
(through negotiated benefit sharing arrangements or 
court-ordered damages awards). Specifically, the expected 
amount of money would have to be large enough that the 
community could repay impact investors while retaining 
enough money to meet its needs and compensate for any 
actual or anticipated adverse impacts.87 
 
Why might impact investors be willing to finance 
community support? 
Impact investors may only be willing to finance community 
support if they can adequately assess the likelihood of producing 
both a measurable positive social or environmental impact and 
a financial return. This will depend on whether sufficient data 
exists to assess the risk and expected return of the investment, a 
cost-effective financial instrument is available to facilitate the 
provision of funding, and arrangements are in place to robustly 
monitor and report on the impacts of funding in each case. 
Impact investors interested in market-rate returns may not be 
interested in, or appropriate for, financing community support.88 
 
Why might donors be willing to participate? 
Foundations and other donors are increasingly seeking out 
and designing innovative impact investment opportunities to 
deploy their capital toward mission. In some cases, this 
includes making a financial return that can be re-deployed 
toward further investment. Foundations could play one of two 
roles in an impact investment to finance community support; 
either could be critical in unlocking additional private capital:  
•       As an outcome payer. Foundations could use their grant-
making funds to act as an outcome payer for an SIB; 
doing so would allow them to avoid paying for 
unsuccessful interventions and limit their grant-making 
to interventions that achieve the intended impact.89 
•        As an investor. Foundations could use their endowment 
capital to make a mission-related investment (“MRI”). An 
MRI could be used to finance community support 
provided the investment: (a) furthers the foundation’s 
mission, and (b) meets a “prudent investment” test. This 
test may not be met if the foundation is seeding untested 
financial products or providing first-loss capital to attract 
non-philanthropic investors.90 Alternatively, a foundation 
could invest money reserved for grant-making to finance 
community support as a program-related investment 
(“PRI”) to pursue a concessionary investment or catalyze 
co-investment. In the U.S., this is permissible provided the 
investment: (a) has the primary purpose of furthering any 
of the foundation’s exempt (charitable) purposes, and (b) 
does not have the significant purpose of producing 
income or the appreciation of property.91
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Would communities and their support providers 
be willing to participate? 
While communities and CSOs may be willing to consider any 
new forms of funding for support, many may be hesitant to 
work with for-profit investors. Especially in contexts where a 
profit motive is regarded as introducing the same dynamics 
that led to the inequality and injustices that many affected 
communities already experience,92 communities may be more 
open to impact investments that de-emphasize the need for a 
market-rate return to investors. The involvement of donors or 
host governments as outcome payers might also make 
communities more comfortable with participating.  
Communities may also be more likely to participate if impact 
investments are made as non-recourse loans, allowing flexibility 
for changes in community strategies. Non-recourse loans would 
extinguish the right of impact investors to be repaid if the 
anticipated activity (such as negotiation or litigation) is 
unsuccessful in producing adequate financial gains for the 
community or is abandoned before gains are made. To attract 
impact investors, a non-recourse loan could be complemented 
by having an external guarantor, such as a DFI or donor, which 
would pay the investor in such circumstances. 
4. THIRD PARTY FUNDING 
 
Third party funding is occasionally used to finance community 
support—specifically, legal support to litigate claims for monetary 
damages or compensation. No instances of third party funding for 
community legal support for contract negotiations or other 
processes were identified in this research. Third party litigation 
funders typically agree to finance the costs of litigation and any 
indemnity (such as for costs orders against the client if it loses) in 
exchange for a financial interest in the outcome of the case. This 
interest could be a share of the money awarded to the claimant, 
a multiple of the amount the financier provided, or a combination 
of the two,96 depending on what was agreed beforehand. Third 
party funding is usually “non-recourse,” meaning that if the case 
is unsuccessful, the funder is not repaid for the money it has spent.  
Before agreeing to work with third party funders, communities 
need to carefully consider the desirability of working with a for-
profit partner. On the one hand, funders can offer financial and 
strategic might to inexperienced claimants, which can reduce 
power imbalances between an affected community and its 
well-resourced company counter-party. Indeed, litigating 
against companies may require significant amounts of money, 
especially where a company’s defense strategy includes tactics 
to increase the length of a case, and hence the amount of 
expensive legal services needed by a community claimant.97
PROPOSAL: THE RTC IMPACT FUND
The RTC Impact Fund proposes a portfolio of investments in legal and technical support for communities affected by natural resource 
projects in the global south to enable communities to negotiate benefit agreements with companies.93 Capital for each investment 
would likely come first from foundations and other donors willing to take on greater risk for lesser returns, in the form of program-
related investments. Other impact investors may later be encouraged to join, especially if donor investors are willing to assume first 
loss risk.94 Recipient communities would pay the funding back over time by allocating a percentage of the revenue they earn from 
the benefit agreements they have signed. The transactional costs associated with each loan are not yet known but are expected to 
be considerable, given the time and resources needed to understand the local context and to work with community members before 
a loan can be contemplated. If the company only has to share revenues with the community when it starts production or generates 
a profit, the community may not receive any revenues for several years, increasing the likely timeline for repayment. 
One question the RTC Impact Fund may face is determining what the consequences would be if the community changes course 
after receiving funding for legal support. To avoid a community feeling pressured to sacrifice its priorities in order to quickly reach 
an agreement and start earning revenue, RTC Impact Fund is considering using non-recourse loans and is seeking to attract 
investors more concerned with achieving a positive social impact than with financial returns.95 The RTC Impact Fund model may 
also only be applicable to sectors or commodities that are especially profitable, such as large-scale extractive industry projects. 
Industries with smaller profit margins, such as agriculture and forestry, may result in much smaller payments to communities, 
limiting the amount of money that communities would be able to pay back.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  25
INNOVATIVE FINANCING SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND INVESTMENTS
On the other hand, third party funding itself can also introduce 
power imbalances—between financiers, who are typically well-
resourced and experienced, and community claimants, who may 
be contemplating litigation for the first time. Funders view cases 
that they finance as investments, and thus may wish to oversee 
how the litigation is conducted; whether or not this is permitted 
under domestic law varies in different jurisdictions.98 Funders also 
do not typically have any legal duties to the financed community,99 
which is in stark contrast to the fiduciary obligations for profit 
maximization that funders owe to their shareholders. This 
introduces the risk that some funders may interpose themselves 
in the lawyer-client relationship and seek to direct or influence 
decisions in ways that are not in the community’s interests. Having 
an experienced and trusted legal team can help to minimize 
power imbalances with the funder, and guard against an unfair 
funding agreement. Host governments also have an important 
role to play in establishing legal frameworks that both facilitate 
and adequately regulate litigation funding. 
Whether third party funding is a viable or desirable option in a 
particular context—for communities and for funders—will 
depend upon various considerations. These include: 
•        The funder’s criteria. Litigation funders often have criteria 
for financing a case, which can include: strong prospects 
of winning; the defendant having the resources to meet 
any judgment for damages; and the claimant having a 
credible strategy for enforcing a successful judgment. To 
ensure financial feasibility, funders often require that the 
amount of funding requested and/or the amount of 
anticipated damages be above a minimum amount, or 
that the legal costs to be financed be proportionate to the 
claim amount or the work required for the case itself.100 
•       The jurisdiction’s legal framework. An initial hurdle is 
whether third party funding is legally permissible in the 
relevant jurisdiction.101 A strong legal regime to regulate 
the funder-client relationship should also be a pre-
requisite for communities contemplating third party 
funding. Communities should check whether there are 
laws that help to avoid exploitative arrangements. Such 
laws include requirements that a judge approve any 
agreement for financing legal support before a case 
begins, as occurs in Ontario, Canada.102 Appropriate laws 
will require judges to make sure that: 
• The claimants’ lawyers are appropriately qualified to 
conduct the litigation. 
• The funding agreement does not give the funder an 
unacceptable degree of influence over how litigation 
is conducted and whether or not to accept a 
settlement offer.  
• The share payable to the funder, if the claimant wins 
an award for damages, accords with best practice.  
• The terms of any settlement that the parties reach 
would produce an equitable result.103 
        In circumstances where no such laws exist, communities 
and CSOs working with them risk entering into an 
arrangement that may not prioritize their interests. 
EXAMPLE: ECUADORIAN COMMUNITIES LITIGATE AGAINST TEXACO/CHEVRON 
In addition to a contingency fee arrangement, litigation brought by Ecuadorian peasants and Indigenous people against 
Texaco/Chevron for environmental pollution was financed in part through third party funders, including an individual investor 
and a boutique hedge fund. While these third party funders became involved as the litigation’s scope and complexity expanded, 
they withdrew their investments shortly afterwards, as Chevron sued one of the community’s lawyers for racketeering.104
EXAMPLE: INDONESIAN SEAWEED FARMERS LITIGATE AGAINST PTTEP AUSTRALIA
Harbour Litigation Funding is currently financing a suit brought in Australia by over 13,000 Indonesian seaweed farmers against 
a Thai oil company, PTTEP Australia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd. The suit claims that a 70-day-long oil spill in the Timor Sea in 2009 
caused the farmers a collective loss of earnings of over AUD 200 million. 105
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•       Rule of law in the jurisdiction. Given the importance of 
legal frameworks, third party funding may only be 
advisable for communities where a country’s 
government and judicial system are likely to fairly and 
efficiently enforce laws regulating third party financing. 
Indeed, third party funders may also be reluctant to 
finance legal claims in countries without a strong rule of 
law, where the prospect of success might be weakened 
by unpredictable host state courts or where significant 
costs and challenges associated with enforcing any 
successful judgment may exist. 
 
5. DIRECT COMPANY FUNDING  
 
Companies, given their access to capital and interest in 
ensuring a stable local context for their operations, may wish 
to directly finance community support to facilitate 
consultations,113 negotiations114 or even monitoring115 for a 
specific project. Such an approach does not comprehensively 
increase community access to support providers,116 however, 
and makes each community reliant on the good will of a 
company in a particular case, which will decide how much 
money it will provide, when, and on what conditions. Direct 
payments by a company also raise risks that the support 
provider may be influenced by the company, and/or that the 
community will not trust the support provider. Such an 
approach should therefore be considered with extreme caution.  
In the rare case that a community—or a CSO working to 
support a community—wishes to accept direct company 
funding, steps should be taken to minimize the risk that the 
company will obtain a new form of leverage over the 
community. Such steps can include:  
•       Agreeing on clear written rules concerning amounts 
payable, timelines, and acceptable uses of the money. 
•       Having an impartial third party receive and disburse 
company money according to those rules.  
•       Giving communities full autonomy in choosing support 
providers.  
•       Where appropriate, front-loading payment of the 
estimated amount of money needed.  
•       In the case of consultation and negotiation processes, 
BOX 3: LEGAL INSURANCE
Legal insurance involves an insurer providing access to legal support, when needed, to insured persons who regularly pay 
premiums (these are calculated based on the likelihood that legal support will be needed and on the cost of that support). Micro-
insurance for legal needs can entitle insured persons access to a limited range of legal support, such as advice hotlines and basic 
document review services, in exchange for smaller premium payments.106 While legal insurance has been used for a number of 
legal issues, it remains relatively untested in the context of land investments.  
Although micro-insurance could theoretically be used to finance a limited range of anticipated or potential legal services in the 
context of land investment, it would have to overcome many challenges. Rural community members in the global south generally 
do not have much excess income to purchase insurance.107 Community members also may not be motivated to pay for insurance 
before companies arrive. And, even if community members did purchase insurance, their claims could be denied by insurers who 
exploit grey areas or misunderstandings about exclusions and coverage in policies.108 In other cases, a lack of appropriate 
regulation may enable insurers to operate without sufficient capital, increasing the risk that insolvency causes them to default 
without honoring valid claims.109 Lawyers financed by legal insurers also may be regarded as serving both the insured and the 
insurer;110 this creates the risk that the lawyer’s professional obligations to their insured client may be undermined by a need to 
maintain a positive relationship with the insurer, which may be the source of future work.  
One example of legal microinsurance is Legalwise, which provides insurance to individuals in South Africa for civil, criminal, and 
labor law matters. Legalwise uses hotlines with trained staff to answer basic legal questions and outsources litigation to external 
lawyers, who usually provide support at significantly reduced rates. Its most basic plan has a monthly premium of around USD 
$7, which affords the insured coverage for legal costs up to around $7,000 per matter.111 This premium attracts clients in the “mid 
to lower” income levels,112 but such an amount would likely not be accessible by affected communities living in extreme poverty.  
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signing a written agreement that the community’s 
acceptance of the money is not evidence of community 
consent to the investment project, and that the 
community has no obligation to repay the money even if 
it eventually withholds its consent or declines to transfer 
rights to its land, where relevant.  
•       Having trusted intermediaries helping communities to 
understand that by accepting the money, and the 
support provided through it, they are not required to 
take (or avoid taking) any particular actions.  
Even with these precautions, the receipt of such money could 
exert subtle pressure on community members who may feel 
indebted to the company, thereby undermining the 
community’s ability to freely decide how it wishes to proceed. 
Communities who are organized, empowered, informed, 
supported by CSOs, and/or based in countries whose laws, 
courts, and government acknowledge and protect community 
land rights will thus be most suited to avoiding such pressure.  
Careful attention also needs to be given to which entity will receive 
the money (see “3. Linking the financing initiative with communities 
and support providers,” below). If the company wishes to pay the 
money to a support provider directly, this may limit the amount of 
support providers willing to accept such funding, as some (but not 
all)117 might refuse to accept company funding.
6. OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR FINANCING 
SUPPORT OR REDUCING COSTS 
 
Other options exist both for raising smaller amounts of money 
and for reducing the cost of support. These will usually need 
to be combined with other financing sources and strategies 
to meet a community’s support needs.  
 
6.1. Crowd funding  
Communities, or the CSOs working with them, can use crowd 
funding to raise money to cover either direct support to 
communities or the costs that accompany such support. 
Crowd funding typically involves using fundraising websites120 
to secure cash donations from large numbers of individuals 
for specific campaigns. People who contribute money 
typically do not gain any financial interest in the legal matter 
or activity that is financed.  
Successful crowd funding campaigns are able to reach a wide 
audience and present a compelling case for making a 
donation. They may appeal to people’s emotions or reassure 
potential contributors by showing an organization’s record of 
good governance, transparency, and effectiveness.121 Some 
EXAMPLE: FUNDING PREPARATION AND NEGOTIATION IN AUSTRALIA
In Australia, Argyle Diamonds Limited (owned by Rio Tinto) paid more than AUD 2 million over several years to a land council 
working on behalf of Aboriginal native title holders. The land council spent this money on preparatory processes (such as an 
ethnography of traditional owners, hydrological consultants, and social impact assessment consultants) and negotiation activities 
(including for drafting memoranda of understanding and contracts).118
EXAMPLE: FINANCING CSO ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IN THE U.S.
Lundin’s (formerly Rio Tinto’s) Eagle Mine Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) requires the company to make payments 
every six months to a foundation, which disburses money to a CSO that is charged with monitoring the mining project once an oversight 
board approves the CSO’s work plan. The CEMP does not, however, provide funding to community members to decide on their monitoring 
needs and is thus not an example of the financing of legal or technical support. The agreement establishing the CEMP was between the 
company and the CSO, reducing the ability for community members to participate in the design of the arrangement. And while the original 
program included an oversight role for community members, a 2016 amendment of the agreement removed that role.119 
28  |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
FINANCING SOLUTIONS
crowd funding websites also regularly provide quantitative 
data to demonstrate how people’s money is being spent.122 
Reaching potential contributors in wealthier countries and 
aligning crowd funding campaigns with popular social 
movements can also help to increase money raised.123 
Different processes or actions could feasibly be the basis for a 
crowd funding campaign, provided that there is a 
demonstrable and compelling reason that funded support will 
lead to a positive outcome for the community. For instance, a 
crowd funding campaign to finance a court case that a 
community wishes to pursue would need to demonstrate why 
having legal or technical support would help the community 
to achieve a positive outcome, such as court-ordered 
compensation for rights violations, or the preservation or 
restoration of their livelihoods or dignity.  
Crowd funding is often done on a project- or organization-
specific basis; this scope helps to craft clear narratives and 
explain how the money will be used. Where strong narratives 
exist around specific issues or developments, crowd funding 
for initiatives with a broader scope may be possible. For 
instance, the Time’s Up Fund drew on a growing concern about 
sexual harassment to crowd fund for a nation-wide Legal 
Defense Fund (see Box 4).  
 
6.2. Profits from social enterprises and side businesses 
Communities, or support providers, can use money earned 
through social enterprises to subsidize the costs of support. 
One example is BRAC’s legal aid clinics in Bangladesh: 73% of 
the clinics’ total costs are covered by revenue from BRAC’s 
social enterprise businesses, which include selling dairy and 
animal products and providing agricultural services, such as 
refrigerated food storage.125 Other support providers earn 
revenues from services more closely linked to their daily work; 
for instance, Cambodia’s Community Legal Education Center 
rents out its conference room and offers for-fee training 
programs on different legal topics.126 
Social enterprises can help develop steady long-term revenue 
streams,127 as opposed to more volatile financial contributions 
from donors or other sources, whose priorities may change 
over time. They can thus contribute to an initiative’s long-term 
financial sustainability, even if other complementary funding 
sources will also be needed. 
 
6.3. Affordable user fees / provision of in-kind services 
to support provider 
While community members will usually not be able to cover the 
full costs of support providers, pooling resources may make 
paying for needed support providers more feasible.128 
Alternatively, economies of scale may be achieved if multiple 
community members pay a paralegal to carry out certain services 
on their behalf, such as obtaining documents from far away 
courts or administrative offices, thus saving time and reducing 
costs associated with travel.129 The Deme So initiative in Mali 
follows this model, and community members also perform in-
kind work for paralegals, such as cleaning, cooking, or feeding 
cattle.130 Affordable user fees and in-kind payments can help to 
encourage community buy-in and engagement with the services 
provided.131 Community contributions could also be added into 
a basket fund and might help to “dilute” the perceived influence 
of other contributors of funding, such as companies. 
 
6.4. Contingency fees 
In some jurisdictions, lawyers are permitted to offer 
contingency fees or uplift fees to clients, effectively making the 
lawyer the source of funding.132 Contingency arrangements 
usually operate on the basis that the client pays no money up 
front for the legal services, but if the client successfully secures 
a “contingency-generating event,” such as a payment of 
damages in a court case, the lawyer is entitled to an agreed-
upon payment, which could be the lawyer’s fees as usually 
calculated or a percentage of the money secured by the client. 
If the contingency-generating event is not achieved, the lawyer 
EXAMPLE: CROWD FUNDING FOR LITIGATION 
The International Senior Lawyers Project raised over USD $7,000 for incidental costs, such as local travel and printing costs, 
relating to a UK lawsuit brought on behalf of 200 farmers in Cambodia against Tate & Lyle Sugars.124 The farmers were represented 
by pro bono lawyers in the UK, US, and Cambodia. 
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is not paid for the work done. Uplift fees operate on a similar 
basis, but calculate payment based on a percentage or 
multiple of the lawyer’s usual fee for the work performed. 
Contingency and uplift fees will not be applicable to instances 
where the community is not expected to secure a large amount 
of money, such as when it seeks a declaration or injunction 
from a Court. 
Contingency and uplift fees might be used to finance 
community support for contract negotiations with a company 
and, potentially, litigation. Such fees will only be useful, 
however, when the negotiation or litigation could secure a 
sufficiently large payment to the community. Some 
jurisdictions prohibit contingency or uplift fees in litigation 
because such fees give lawyers a direct financial interest in the 
case, which can compromise lawyers’ independence and 
change the lawyer-client relationship.133 The use of such fees 
for transactional services in commercial settings is common—
both for lawyers134 and for non-legal professionals, whose fee 
arrangements are often less strictly regulated. Contingency 
and uplift fees—whether for litigation or contract 
negotiations—should be considered with caution and only 
used where a sufficient degree of trust between the community 
and support provider exists, and preferably where a 
community can easily seek review of a contingency or uplift 
arrangement by a judge or trusted legal expert, if needed. 
6.5. Fee recovery and costs protections 
Host government lawmakers and courts can develop laws that 
shield affected communities and other public interest 
claimants from the expensive nature of litigation. While eligible 
“public interest” cases are often limited to specific cases 
brought against the government,136 greater protection would 
be afforded to community claimants if such entitlements 
extended to relevant cases against companies. 
•       Before a case begins, courts could consider awarding 
advance funding of community claimants’ costs by the 
respondent government or company where: the 
community cannot afford the litigation; the case has 
prima facie merits (meaning that initial evidence the 
community presents, without being questioned by the 
other side, seems to prove the case); and the case is of 
public importance.137 
•       If a community claimant is successful, fee-shifting rules 
could entitle claimants to secure fee awards, payable by 
their counter-party, to cover their lawyers’ costs. Even in 
cases where lawyers act on a pro bono or low cost basis, 
fee awards for public interest litigation in some 
jurisdictions are calculated by multiplying the number of 
hours a lawyer spends on a case by the market rate for a 
private lawyer with comparable experience; a less 
complicated model is to have a set hourly rate that 
applies to all cases.138 
•        If a community claimant is unsuccessful, the law in some 
places may allow a court to avoid ordering the community 
to pay the other side’s legal costs. This may be possible 
where the court considers it to have been in the public 
interest to have heard the case. In some cases, courts even 
make a fee awards in favor of unsuccessful claimants, 
where the case involves testing fundamental constitutional 





Stakeholders seeking to develop a financing initiative must consider a range of issues 
that have implications for the initiative’s sustainability and design. We focus here on 
three sets of considerations: those relating to the amount of money needed; those 
concerning efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability; and those addressing the 
links between the initiative, communities, and support providers.
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THE AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED 
Community preferences and needs 
Anticipating the preferences of target communities for specific 
types of support providers can help to predict the likely 
amount of money required. For instance, some communities 
may prefer a local lawyer who understands their context, while 
others may prefer support from outsiders who, while 
potentially more expensive, may be perceived as less likely to 
be influenced by powerful local stakeholders.140 Some 
communities may also be less interested in working with 
specific types of support providers—such as lawyers—at all. 
For instance, in Liberia, many people distrust the country’s 
legal system and thus may be less interested in engaging in 
formal legal processes, such as litigation.141 
In addition to community preferences, financing initiatives could 
also respond to unrecognized community needs. For example, 
a community that obtains support before decisions about a 
proposed investment are made can be empowered to influence 
decision-making processes in ways that protect community 
rights and livelihoods. Yet communities often will not seek 
support until something goes wrong.142 Awareness raising and 
trainings can empower communities to seek out support at a 
much earlier stage. Costs associated with any awareness raising 
and trainings that might be needed should also be factored into 
estimates of the amount of money required. 
 
Scope 
Another factor affecting a financing initiative’s costs is its 
potential scope. For instance, an initiative could cover a 
specific area, country, or continental region, or a specific 
commodity or industry. Adjustments to scope will affect the 
number of communities requiring support, affecting the 
amount of money needed. 
 
Data to estimate costs and feasibility 
Reviewing relevant information concerning support needs and 
costs—in light of the initiative’s desired focus, scope, and 
objectives—can help to predict the likely overall amount of 
money needed for a specific initiative. Yet the generation of 
data may be another cost. Useful data might include:  
•        Within the parameters of the desired scope, the numbers 
of actual or anticipated investment projects and of 
affected communities that would likely require financing 
assistance, as well as other information to help determine 
the likelihood that such support will be needed. Legal 
needs surveys, if available, can provide useful insight into 
the legal support needs of specific populations.143 
•       The likely costs, availability, capacity, and effectiveness 
of types of support that communities might use, and the 
likely duration of such support, which may be gleaned 
from sources including courts, legal aid organizations, 
bar councils, and support providers themselves. 
Data can also help different actors understand the feasibility 
of generating a financial return or of otherwise defraying the 
costs of financing support:  
•       Information about household incomes in target areas, 
for example, can help to reveal whether models based 
on user fees or legal insurance are feasible.  
•       Information about the likely financial outcomes for 
supported communities (how likely is it that the 
community will earn revenue from a benefit agreement 
or secure damages from a court case?) will help 
determine whether initiatives reliant on the generation 
of a financial return, such as impact investments or third-
party funding, are feasible.  
•       Data about political, economic, and governance risks—
such as the risk of corruption, fraud or theft, project 
failure, insolvency, market price fluctuation, or an 
inability to enforce a successful judgment—can help 
impact investors, third party funders, and lawyers acting 
on a contingency or uplift basis to determine whether or 
not their financing strategy is feasible.  
 
EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS,  
AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Keeping costs of support low 
In addition to increasing financing available to communities, 
financing initiatives can also try to reduce costs of support. 
Strategies to keep the costs of support low include:  
•       “Unbundling” or separating the legal and technical 
needs of communities into tasks for which higher and 
lower cost support (and hence financing) is needed, as 
well as tasks that can be done by community members 
themselves.144 
•       Using low-cost services that charge fees that community 
members can afford for basic procedural tasks, such as 
obtaining official documents.  
•       Using or encouraging pro bono or low cost support145 
(or contingency fees), and capping specific amounts of 
money available for specific tasks (with discretionary 
processes for additional funding, as needed). See, for 
example, Box 4, below. 
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•        Relatedly, crowd and/or expert sourcing—submitting a 
call for assistance with specific legal or technical tasks146 
through online platforms or existing networks—may help a 
community to minimize the tasks for which it needs to pay 
for support. However, there would be no guarantee of the 
independence or expertise of those who answer such calls 
for assistance. Potentially relevant tasks include reviewing 
technical documents, researching the company’s 
reputation and conduct in previous projects, and 
conducting legal research. 147Most tasks would need to be 
reviewed by the community’s support provider. 
Confidentiality concerns, whether strategic or raised by the 
company, might limit when crowd sourcing will be feasible. 
 
Financial sustainability 
Any financing initiative needs to be financially sustainable so 
that it can continue to provide funding in the short, medium, 
and long term. 
One strategy to help extend the lifespan of a financing initiative 
is to divert a percentage of all money raised into a reserve fund. 
Sometimes called “endowment funds,”150 reserve funds are 
invested to generate additional returns, thereby increasing the 
total amount of money in the fund over time. For instance, a 
fund established for communities affected by the Yanacocha 
mine in Peru reserves over 25% of its annual income to be 
reinvested.151 One drawback of reserve funds is they reduce the 
budget for spending, at least in the beginning,152 which might 
be challenging if a limited amount of money has been raised. 
In addition, reserve funds may fail to grow or even shrink if 
investments do not perform well. Financing initiatives that rely 
on endowments without regularly generating additional 
money may also simply run out of money.153
In addition to those discussed in “6. Other solutions for 
financing support or reducing costs,” above, strategies for 
raising additional and ongoing funding for an initiative will 
vary depending on the approach taken. Common 
considerations include: 
•       Frequency of financial contributions. Requiring money 
to be paid regularly, such as annually, or securing 
commitments to regular payments outside of mandatory 
schemes, can help to maintain the lifespan of the 
financing initiative. For example, Sierra Leone’s 2013 
Draft Guidelines on Sustainable Agricultural and 
Bioenergy Investment include the establishment of a 
Community Justice Fund, financed by companies, who 
would periodically pay a mandatory fee. Obtaining one-
off contributions, on the other hand, will require regular 
fundraising efforts. An exception might be if one-off 
contributions are large enough to cover all relevant 
future support needs; for example, if the support is 
intended for a short period of time, such as during the 
closure phase of a project. 
•       The strength of commitments to provide funding. An 
initiative’s financial sustainability can be undermined if 
some actors fail to pay. The chances of such failure might 
depend on how robust each actor’s commitment to pay 
is. For instance, legal requirements to pay fees in 
exchange for licenses, and contractual obligations to 
provide future funding, will generally be more reliable 
than purely voluntary commitments to provide funding. 
Another potential source of obligation could be to 
require companies to pay into a relevant financing 
initiative as a condition of MSI membership or DFI 
investment in the company’s investment project. 
•       Ensuring that financing commitments can be met. If a 
community is granted funding for a specific process (for 
BOX 4: FINANCING LOW-COST LEGAL SUPPORT – THE TIME’S UP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
The Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund, established in the wake of growing awareness of workplace sexual harassment in the United 
States, collects donations and then pays for (or defrays the costs of) very specific types of U.S.-based legal support relating to 
workplace sexual harassment and retaliation. To maximize cost efficiency, the fund requires participating support providers—
who apply for funding—to provide a free initial consultation to their client. It also imposes monetary caps for different services 
(for complainants bringing civil claims, investigation is capped at USD $3,000, pre-filing work and negotiation at $10,000, trial 
litigation at $100,000, and appeals at $50,000).148 The fund has also obtained a significant amount of pro bono and low-cost 
support149 and participating attorneys commit to repaying the fund if they successfully obtain an award for legal costs.
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instance, contract negotiations) and if the money is paid 
incrementally, the estimated total amount of money that 
the community will need for the entire process should be 
set aside. This can help to avoid running out of money 
for the support before a matter concludes, even if the 
initiative eventually runs out of money. 
 
Scope (again) and political and contextual challenges 
In addition to affecting the amount of money required, scope 
can affect the feasibility and appropriateness of different 
types of financing initiatives. For instance, a host government 
is unlikely to be interested in marshaling revenue to finance 
support for communities outside of its jurisdiction, which 
could mean that government marshaling is less feasible for 
initiatives with a global scope (unless pursued by home 
governments, whose outward investing companies may 
operate in multiple countries). A relevant impact investment 
mechanism, on the other hand, could apply to a range of 
countries, provided they have the preconditions required to 
establish a workable investment. Initiatives built for the 
national (or subnational or local) levels can also be better 
adapted to the specific local context, including local laws, 
support provider culture, and community conditions. Sector- 
or commodity-specific initiatives, however, which may benefit 
from important entry and leverage points, may be able to 
apply across countries.154 
Scope can affect an initiative’s political complexity. National-
level initiatives, for example, may require the buy-in of a large 
number of stakeholders, each of whom might bring different, 
potentially conflicting, agendas (see discussion of Peace Nexus’s 
Morocco trust fund, page 19). Similarly, initiatives applying to 
multiple countries may face added complications in navigating 
the regulatory and support provider contexts of multiple 
jurisdictions.155 Piloting the initiative with a smaller scope may 
help to address initial challenges before it is scaled up.156 
Actors seeking to establish a financing initiative should pay 
attention to the context in which the initiative would operate, 
anticipating and avoiding political obstacles to the initiative’s 
effective operation. If an initiative is perceived as a threat by 
powerful actors (such as public officials receiving illicit benefits 
from a company or bar associations resistant to making services 
cheaper if that would reduce revenues for their members), they 
may seek to shut down or block the initiative.157 Options to 
avoid, or minimize the impacts of, such challenges include: 
closely involving powerful actors from the early stages to 
encourage their buy-in; piloting the initiative in areas or sectors 
outside of such actors’ sphere of influence or interest; and 
seeking legal advice to make sure an initiative is established in 
accordance with domestic laws, which could help avoid legal 
challenges by actors threatened by its existence. 
 
Political economy  
Introducing a financing initiative may create political economy 
implications that should be carefully addressed. Opportunistic 
actors, for example, may regard an initiative as a new source 
of money more generally—especially in low-income country 
contexts where communities, government, and other local 
actors are typically under-resourced. This can encourage 
undesirable outcomes, such as corruption, local elite capture, 
rent seeking, or an increased number of frivolous legal claims. 
A new source of potential funding may also have unintended 
effects on existing support providers. For example, it may 
elevate support providers who are savvy fundraisers over those 
who more effectively serve the interests of communities.158 A 
new initiative could also distort a support provider’s priorities, 
causing it to alter how it supports specific communities or, 
more generally, to “follow the money,” creating new support 
gaps for the less remunerative work it leaves behind.  
A financing initiative can take various steps to address such 
concerns; for instance: 
•        Drawing on a network of existing, trusted support 
providers (usually local CSOs), particularly those that have 
already worked with the communities eligible for financing, 
can minimize rent seeking from unscrupulous actors.159 
•       Quality control measures may also be helpful, to 
increase the likelihood that support providers who are 
financed will faithfully serve the community’s needs in 
line with the financing initiative’s objectives. These can 
include conducting due diligence on support providers 
(including requiring references, proof of expertise or 
experience, and/or endorsement from professional 
bodies) and regular surveys and other low-cost 
monitoring strategies to gauge the satisfaction of the 
community or a CSO supporting the community with 
each support provider financed. A balance will need to 
be struck between the degree of scrutiny each potential 
support provider receives and the need to minimize the 
cost of doing so.160 
•       Investing in the development of future support 
providers through scholarships, training, and other 
relevant interventions can also help increase the number 
of appropriately qualified and locally-based support 
providers, although this may require significant amounts 
of money and time.
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•       Strong governance arrangements (see below), including 
an arrangement for a third party to collect and allocate 
money, will help avoid misappropriation. 
 
Governance 
A financing initiative must be administered fairly and must 
guard against misappropriation of money. Steps must also 
be taken to avoid contributors having, or being perceived to 
have, undue influence over recipients, whether communities 
or support providers.161 These attributes can be facilitated by 
incorporating the following features:  
•       Mission and guiding principles. Having an overarching 
mission—for example, “to finance legal and technical 
support to empower communities to protect their 
human rights and advance their sustainable 
development in the context of investment”—can help 
orient an initiative and ground the development of 
spending criteria. A mission can be aided by guiding 
principles; for example: “funding should not be used to 
influence a community or support provider,” “nobody 
should interfere with a community’s relationship with its 
support provider,” “the provision of funding should avoid 
the potential for division or conflict within a community,” 
or “no one gets rich from the financing initiative.”162 
•       Criteria for the management, allocation, and use of 
money. Pre-designed criteria that guide the operational 
and implementation aspects of the initiative can help to 
achieve the initiative’s objectives. Criteria can help 
manage and predict expenditures and reduce the risk of 
misappropriation. Such criteria can also mitigate risks 
that money might be used in unintended ways—such as 
for frivolous cases or non-priority legal strategies—that 
would disproportionately deplete the initiative and 
discourage funding sources from contributing initial or 
additional funding. Spending criteria can include: 
• Acceptable types of support providers. Can 
communities use the money to procure support from 
CSOs, legal professionals, and/or non-legal experts?  
• Processes for which support can be financed. Are  
any processes or strategies, such as litigation,  
not permitted? 
• Any monetary limits. For example, the Time’s Up 
Fund imposes monetary caps for different litigation 
stages, such as evidence gathering, pre-filing work 
and negotiation, trial litigation, and appeals (see  
Box 4, above).163 
•       A trusted, impartial administrator. The financing 
initiative should be administered by a trusted entity 
(potentially aided by an equally trusted advisory 
council164). The nature of this entity will depend on the 
source of the money, among other factors. For instance, 
if companies are the primary funding source, they may 
prefer to entrust independent entities with experience 
managing and disbursing money. Similarly, while a 
government that marshals revenue may be reluctant 
(and/or legally unable) to delegate authority to spend 
that revenue to a non-governmental entity, it may be 
willing to entrust an independent public entity such as a 
national human rights institution. 
•       Oversight bodies and processes. Additional checks on 
how the initiative operates can include appointing 
independent watchdogs165 or oversight boards166 and 
establishing grievance procedures.  
•       Community autonomy. To help mitigate power 
imbalances and encourage support providers to be 
responsive to community priorities, the choice of 
support provider, both before and during the provision 
of support, must reside with the community itself, even if 
the money that pays for it is managed by a trusted CSO 
working with the community. This will help the 
community to be empowered, and not controlled, by its 
support provider; it can also help minimize the risk of the 
support provider-client relationship being undermined 
by the fact that a third party is financing the support.167 
Giving communities control over who supports them will 
also help catalyze community rights, such as the right to 
give or withhold free, prior and informed consent.168 
Such community choices may be subject to reasonable 
restrictions, discussed above. 
•       Quality control measures (discussed above).
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LINKING THE FINANCING INITIATIVE WITH 
COMMUNITIES AND SUPPORT PROVIDERS 
Actors establishing a financing initiative should reflect carefully 
on how to enable communities using available funding to 
procure the support they need. Issues to consider include: 
•        Can local CSOs act as a bridge between communities, 
funding, and support providers? Communities may not 
always seek support when needed and, when they do, 
might not be aware of an available financing initiative or 
of specific support providers that have the skills and 
experience needed.169 Awareness raising, training, and 
other educational efforts—both about investment 
processes more generally and about the financing 
initiative in particular—may help to address these 
challenges.170 In addition, local CSOs can play an 
important bridging role. CSOs can help identify when a 
community needs additional support, are more likely to 
know of any available financing initiative, and can assist 
the community in accessing, funding, and making good 
use of the support they need.171 
•       What if no relevant local CSO exists? Communities 
searching for legal support funding without the help of a 
local CSO may need to be connected with relevant 
support providers. In some cases, no relevant locally-
based CSO may exist. In such a situation, a financing 
initiative should be prepared to support the community 
in a neutral but empowering manner to locate the 
support it needs. This may include, for example, working 
with the local community to develop a governance 
structure that could take the lead in identifying support 
providers through outreach to different organizations. Or 
it might include helping to identify a local CSO with 
some relevant skills and experience working with 
communities (even if not on issues relating to 
investments). A third strategy would be to maintain a 
network or register of relevant support providers. To 
build trust and enable the community to select support 
providers without feeling influenced by the financing 
initiative, it might be preferable for a trusted third party 
to maintain the network. For instance, a network of 
support providers could be maintained by a national 
human rights institution, as discussed in “Proposal: 
Financing legal services through company fees in Sierra 
Leone,” above. Alternatively, an initiative may need to 
consider helping to establish new local organizations 
that can adequately support communities,172 although 
this can be an expensive and long-term endeavor. 
•       Who makes the payment to each support provider? 
Transferring money directly to communities on the 
understanding that they would then pay support 
providers could present some risks, including 
misappropriation or internal community disputes over 
how the money will be managed. Yet many CSOs may be 
subject to similar risks if they are not accustomed to 
managing large amounts of money.173 Further, 
communities need to choose which support providers 
are financed. Direct transfers to communities thus might 
be appropriate—or even preferable—in some 
circumstances. For instance, if a company offers direct 
funding and the community has a reliable plan to 
manage it, transferring money to the community may be 
more suitable than having the company pay the 
community’s support provider directly. For other 
financing approaches, it may be preferable to have clear 
rules that place the choice of support provider squarely 
within the community’s control (subject to the criteria 
discussed in “Governance,” above), while having the 
financing initiative itself actually making payments to 
each support provider.  
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Around the world, communities affected by land and resource investments have an 
urgent need for increased funding for the legal and technical support required to 
protect their rights and interests. New financing models exist, but require both 
catalytic and sustained efforts by a range of different actors. Each model also presents 
its own challenges, which must be carefully addressed. This report calls different 
stakeholders to action to use the tools available to them to advance opportunities 
to fill the financing gap.
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It remains to be seen whether a global initiative or a patchwork 
of different smaller-scale initiatives is the optimal way to meet 
the support needs of affected communities. In the meantime, 
different financing solutions for various scales and contexts 
should be tested. At the same time, the potential for a global 
initiative—financed by, for instance, significant bilateral and 
multilateral aid, philanthropic grants, and private sector 
contributions as part of a collaborative effort to advance SDG 
16—should be explored.  
Any new financing initiative should strive first and foremost to 
empower affected communities. Among other things, this 
means assessing current and potential power imbalances, and 
developing governance approaches that avoid the replication 
of imbalances within the initiative and that remedy imbalances 
outside of it. And while the incentives of potential funding 
sources should be factored into an initiative’s design, the needs 
and priorities of the ultimate recipients of the support—
communities—must fundamentally shape the initiative. 
Otherwise, any financing initiative that is developed risks 
becoming a pot of money that falls far short of its objectives, 
is under-used, or—worse still—causes internal fracturing, 
division, and fall out within specific communities or CSOs. 
In line with the findings of this report, we offer the following 
recommendations: 
Donors, including foundations and bilateral and multilateral 
aid organizations, already deploy grants to provide crucial 
funding for community support. This should continue. In 
addition, donors should:  
•       Leverage their extensive capital, experience, and access 
to different stakeholders to catalyze, pilot, and help 
establish new financing initiatives.  
•       Act as an impartial interlocutor to facilitate cooperation 
on the issue, including between actors who may not be 
accustomed to collaborating in highly politicized or 
contentious contexts.  
•       Focus, in particular, on the potential for basket funds to 
transform short-term donor funding and facilitation 
efforts into long-term, self-sustaining financing initiatives 
that significantly improve community access to legal and 
technical support.  
•       Continue to advance strategies for supporting the  
next generation of global-south based community 
support providers. 
Host governments can play a range of productive roles to 
increase available funding for community legal and technical 
support. Specifically, governments: 
•        Can seek to establish financing initiatives, and marshal 
additional revenues to finance them. Any such initiatives 
should carefully incorporate the needs and perspectives of 
communities and support providers in line with this report.  
•        Should sensitize companies about the importance of 
adequately and appropriately financed community 
support. Where a basket fund or other relevant financing 
initiative exists, governments should encourage companies 
to contribute funding. Where it does not, governments 
could encourage companies to explore the potential for the 
establishment of a new, independently structured initiative. 
•        Should establish adequate legal frameworks to facilitate 
and adequately regulate potential private sector- or 
practitioner-focused solutions for financing legal support, 
including third party funding, contingency and uplift fees, 
fee recovery rules, and, potentially, legal insurance. 
Communities and the CSOs that support them can use the 
solutions and considerations in this report to develop concrete 
funding-related requests, demands, advocacy campaigns, and 
negotiation strategies. For those communities or CSOs 
interested in promoting such opportunities, they should 
identify strategic moments—such as when laws or policies 
concerning land and investment are being drafted, or 
moments where international or national attention can be 
captured—to create pressure, and advance arguments and 
ideas, for establishing expansive and robustly-governed 
financing solutions. 
Private sector actors should use their financial resources and 
spheres of influence to contribute to appropriately structured 
and governed basket funds and other financing initiatives.  
•       Agribusiness, forestry, and other natural resource 
companies should finance basket funds that apply 
beyond individual projects, and should commit to 
contributing funding regularly, on a long-term basis.  
•       Buyers of agricultural or forest commodities—such as 
companies from the food and beverage industry, among 
a range of others—should contribute funding to basket 
funds and encourage or require the companies they buy 
from to also do so.  
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•       DFIs and private financiers should share expertise to 
help with the establishment and operation of robustly 
governed, independent basket funds. They should also 
consider contributing funding to relevant basket funds—
to help seed them, to cover their operational costs, or to 
be pooled with other money collected. Finally, DFIs and 
private financiers should encourage or require client 
companies to contribute funding to basket funds. 
•        MSIs and other bodies with company members should 
continue to innovate and, when relevant, work to make 
their own financing initiatives more accessible to 
communities and their support providers. Such bodies 
should also consider contributing funding to 
independently established basket funds and encouraging 
or requiring their member companies to do so. 
Impact investors and impact investment funds should 
continue to explore the possibility of investing in community 
support, and ensure that any investments avoid onerous and 
unrealistic repayment obligations for communities. 
Fee-charging lawyers should: 
•       Ensure any proposed third party funding agreements 
protect the lawyer-client relationship and preserve the 
community’s ultimate ability to control decisions that 
will affect their rights and interests. 
•       Investigate the legality and feasibility of charging 
contingency or uplift fees for community clients, and 
ensure that the terms of such fees are fairly calibrated. 
•       Explore ways to reduce costs for community clients, 
including by unbundling legal tasks so that some tasks 
can be undertaken by community members or by less 
costly support providers. 
•       Consider accepting in-kind repayments or affordable, 
reduced user fees paid by community members themselves. 
•       For litigated matters, consider the feasibility of applying 
to the court for advance funding of the community’s costs 
before the case proceeds and/or for fee shifting afterwards. 
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